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The paper investigates the transmission of macroeconomic factors into the price-setting
behavior of a specific dealer in the FX market. This problem is viewed from the perspective of a
central banker who observes the price evolution but does not make the market in the home
currency. The central banker’s task is to explain the forex behavior in terms of conventional
economic logic. The analysis is based on a model of a multiple dealer market under two
organizations: direct inter-dealer and brokered. The model is constructed in such a way as to
reflect the most prominent features of the market for the Czech koruna and, accordingly, to
address some issues of key relevance to the Czech National Bank’s exchange rate policy.
We show that the totality of the exchange rate-relevant fundamental factors influence the market
maker’s behavior through a single sufficient statistic, his “marginal” valuation of foreign
currency holdings. Under the two studied trading mechanisms, the marginal valuations across
market participants determine the equilibrium exchange rate by means of different trade
patterns. Specifically, the brokered market is inferior to the direct one in terms of welfare
improvement through trade. It takes a higher inter-dealer trade volume in the brokered market to
absorb a new price impulse. Therefore, the central banker would do best by monitoring the
brokered segment (as the only partially transparent one available), but by conducting
interventions in the direct segment, where the desired impact is easier to achieve.
JEL Codes: F31, G15, C72.
Keywords:  forex microstructure, multiple dealership, order flow, pricing schedule.
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Nontechnical Summary
Reconciling the monetary policymaker’s understanding of observed exchange rate behavior with
that of the market practitioner within the same central bank requires finding a common
denominator for the fundamental characteristics of the economy and the logic of price formation
in a specific FX market. More generally, it is often hard to capture the mechanism whereby the
generally accepted macroeconomic reasoning is reflected in the price-setting behavior of FX
market makers. This is why the methods of forex microstructure theory are being employed by
policymakers to understand how macroeconomic factors and policy measures are channeled into
the national currency valuation in the really existing market.
The present paper uses the techniques of microstructure finance to model a multi-dealer FX
market. We analyze two trading organizations: a direct inter-dealer market and a brokered market.
The information that the FX dealers learn from their received order flow determines how they set
their quotes. The model is constructed in such a way as to reflect the most prominent features of
the market for the Czech koruna and, accordingly, to address the issue of the Czech National
Bank’s ability to influence the koruna exchange rate by policy measures. The problem is viewed
from the perspective of a central banker who observes the price evolution but does not make the
market in the home currency.
The model demonstrates that the exchange rate-relevant fundamental factors influence the market
maker’s behavior through a single sufficient statistic, his “marginal” valuation of foreign currency
holdings. From this theoretical result, we derive consequences for the observed patterns of
currency trade, and show, in particular, that the same exchange rate movement can be caused by
informational, institutional and inventory asymmetry across dealers and between dealers and non-
dealer traders. Moreover, even fully identical dealers are shown to trade non-zero volumes
between themselves, since this is the only way for them to learn the marginal currency valuation
of other market participants.
The contribution to the exchange rate modeling literature consists in:
1.  formulating a realistic exchange rate formation model in which dealers learn about the
currency demand (which is well-defined) and not the fundamental currency value (which is
not well-defined),
2.  visualizing the role of “global” investors – trading with all FX dealers – in disseminating the
fundamental currency supply and demand shocks,
3.  comparing the direct and brokered FX trading mechanisms and consequences in terms of the
trade-off between higher transparency in the brokered market against higher gains from trade
in the direct market,
4.  connecting the price impact of the forex order flow with the indirect foreign currency utilities
of market participants,
5.  providing a rationale for the policymaker observing a more transparent (brokered) segment of
the forex but conducting exchange rate interventions in a more efficient (direct) one.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   3
1. Introduction
It is often difficult to reconcile the international macroeconomist’s understanding of observed
exchange rate behavior with that of the market practitioner. The former seeks to explain the
currency price by the generally accepted fundamental characteristics of the economy (such as
growth, productivity, inflation or interest rate differentials against the reference economy, and
trade and investment flows). The practitioner’s view of the same price is determined by his or her
knowledge of the current demand or supply overhang. The currency trader usually perceives only
the immediate reason for this overhang, such as the liquidity need of a major investor or a position
shift of a significant group of speculators. Even the key economic and policy announcements,
which both categories follow and interpret, fail to create the desired link between these two
exchange rate views. This is because, differently from common stock, it is usually impossible to
find “hard” information concerning any investor’s earnings in the messages about the economy as
a whole as disseminated by news agencies. Accordingly, the impact of economic announcements,
if any, often proves to be short-lived or even counter-intuitive, making these announcements
nearly irrelevant in the longer perspective for economists and traders alike. More generally, it is
hard to define the nature of the information that the FX dealers learn from their received order
flow when they set their quotes. One way is to assume that there is a “fair” value of the currency
known by a well-informed customer, which the dealer discovers in the process of executing the
customer’s order(s). Most practitioners suspect that there is no such thing in reality.
This absence of a common language has generated interest in a novel discipline, forex
microstructure theory, which promises to explain the exchange rate by the economically
justifiable behavior of market participants who utilize a specific trading mechanism. Thus, forex
microstructure theory has taken on the extremely challenging task of applying abstract
microstructure finance to an object, the FX market, which is substantially more complicated than
the markets for most other financial assets. Beside the natural objective of justifying the actions of
those who buy and sell the currency using comprehensive choice-theoretic motives, this new
branch of financial economics has had another – quite thankless – task: to establish a link between
its results and the prevailing orthodoxies of international economics. The present paper
contributes to both objectives by proposing a model with a “common micro–macro denominator”.
Specifically, we show that the marginal (indirect) utility of foreign currency of an optimizing
dealer reflects both the fundamental factors behind the exchange rate and the supply/demand
curve that the dealer operates with when setting quotes or placing orders.
Principal Outputs of the Paper
This paper contains a formal toolkit that allows one to link liquidity, inventory and information in
the Czech koruna market with fundamental shifts in the external position of the Czech economy.
The model constructed to this end captures the preferences and behavior of international dealers,
domestic banks, their clients and international investors. The dealers have the same preference
structure as other investors; their market-maker role is exogenous. The model proposes an
external shock propagation mechanism through the market participant’s indirect utility into
changes in the Czech koruna market value. We abstain from the artificial notion of the “fair4   Alexis Derviz
currency value” discovery. Instead, we model strategic interaction in a quite basic setting of a
normal form game, without a pre-defined statistical law to be discovered or learned.
To avoid the problem of separating customer–dealer from inter-dealer trades
1, the model handles
all components of the received order flow as potentially informative. It is able to characterize the
outcome of an active order of one party reaching the other party in a certain state. Consequently,
an order can have a big or small price impact irrespective of whether it comes from a client or a
dealer. Instead, the impact-determining factor is the marginal currency valuation by the order-
receiving market maker. This marginal valuation can have a low level (prompting the dealer to
reduce position), a high level (expand position) or a neutral level (not to change position). In the
last-mentioned “no-trade” case the marginal valuation induces the agent to abstain from using the
market for own buys or sales. If the received order is big enough to cause a move from this neutral
level to a low marginal valuation level (dictating a position reduction as the optimal action) or to a
high level (creating a preference for position expansion), then the order evidently has a price
impact. This is because the market maker would change his quotes in order to invite the
corresponding trades with other market users. Conversely, if the received order results in a shift in
the originally non-neutral marginal valuation towards the no-trade value, the price impact is
negligible, since the market maker has no need to “provoke” additional trades by shifting quotes.
Altogether, we replace a one-dimensional picture of the order flow impact on prices with a two-
dimensional one, where the price change is a function of both the incoming order and the current
marginal valuation.
The model defines a “global” market user, i.e. an agent who has access to all quotes and trades
with all existing market makers. That is, such an agent has the same possibility of using the inter-
dealer market as the dealers themselves. This feature of the model guarantees straightforward
demand-shock propagation. Indeed, the existence of global investors is the reason why the
observed order flow can serve as a source of future price-relevant information for the dealer.
Since the global investors’ orders are split among all market makers, whilst the order signs and
volumes are determined by their marginal valuations, privately received orders from global
investors confer information about the overall direction in which the market is moving. This is
much more than what can be read off the orders from “local” market users (exclusive clients of a
given dealer); the latter only affect the dealer’s endowment with which the subsequent inter-dealer
trading round is entered.
We construct two variants of the model, one for the direct trading mechanism and the other for
brokered trading mechanism. So, the institutional factors (in particular, the relative transparency
of the brokered trading mechanism against the high liquidity of direct dealership) can be separated
from the tastes, technologies and endowments of economic agents. In the brokered market, the
dealer–client role difference only concerns the limit order submission (in the form of pricing
schedules), which is reserved for the dealers. Both dealers and non-dealers submit market orders.
                                                
1 The main motive behind this is that, as has followed from informal discussions with a number of dealers in
prominent CZK-market participant institutions, the dealers themselves rarely make this distinction. They also
claimed it to be irrelevant for how they operate in the market themselves. That is, at least for the Czech koruna,
the anecdotal evidence collected by the author suggests that the counter-party’s status as a market maker or user
plays no particular role in deciding the information value of the received order.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   5
First, dealer pricing schedules are automatically crossed by the broker and then the integral
“standing pricing schedule” is announced. Therefore, the dealer cannot fully determine the market
user order by means of his own pricing schedule, even if he takes the market user demand as
given. The non-dealer investor in the brokered market is only given access to the standing pricing
schedule. Her order is split proportionally between dealers, based on the totality of their quoting
parameters. Therefore, the market user cannot split orders herself. Altogether, the presumed single
price advantage of the brokered market has a cost: we show that the ability of investors to adjust
their marginal foreign cash utility by trade is limited compared to the direct market.
In the direct market, a market user’s optimal behavior consists in splitting orders between all
market makers in proportions that equalize the marginal values of the purchased/sold quantities
across contacted dealers (see later). This property of our model is similar to that of Bernhardt and
Hughson, 1997, and Menkveld, 2001.
The model possesses a Nash equilibrium that equalizes the market users’ indirect marginal
utilities of foreign cash and the effective quotes of the market makers. The properties of this
equilibrium show that the order flows (of both dealers in the inter-dealer market and their
customers) are functions of these marginal indirect utilities, and so are the quoting parameters (i.e.
the pricing schedule slope and intercept) of the dealers. Although we do not study imperfect or
incomplete information game settings, the chosen benchmark concept of the Nash equilibrium in
the normal form inter-dealer game still broadens our understanding of the learning by dealers
from the order flow. This learning is compressed to one period and is, therefore, more implicit
than is usual in the theoretical microstructure literature. Nevertheless, it allows us to model
equilibrium outcomes in the inter-dealer market in situations where one cannot make a reasonable
assumption about the “true” statistical law of uncertainty. That is, the dealers in our model do not
learn about a stationary distribution of a fundamental factor behind the currency value, but go
directly to learning the instantaneous marginal valuation of the currency by the counter-parties.
Formally, the set of model parameters that can cause dealer heterogeneity is formed by their
exogenously given endowments of domestic and foreign cash. The same variable defined for the
non-dealer investor is the source of the customer order flow. However, the present model does not
belong to the inventory trade category, since the equilibrium outcome properties are driven by the
investor marginal valuations, not the inventory levels directly. This marginal valuation discovery
property manifests itself in many ways, among them the ability of the model to generate non-
trivial hot potato trades in equilibrium, even when dealer inventories are identical. The dealer
directs orders toward other dealers even though he knows that the very same order will be directed
back to him. This is so because a non-zero inter-dealer trade in equilibrium is necessary to infer
the marginal currency values of the counter-parties.
Since the closed form solution could have only be obtained at the cost of many counter-intuitive
simplifications, we have given up the quest for explicitness in favor of numerical solutions of a
few practically relevant cases. Specifically, we compute Nash equilibria of the normal form game
between two dealers and an investor in the FX market. We then conduct comparative statics
analysis of the two market structures for different levels of investor demand.6   Alexis Derviz
Contributions to Czech National Bank Policymaking
The general contribution of the conducted research can be found in an improvement of the
monetary authority’s ability to understand the motives behind the FX market maker quotes and
market user orders. Although the observed “price”, i.e. the exchange rate, always settles down
after any major event in the forex with a relatively short delay, the price formation processes can
vary substantially across dealers and the parts of the market in which they operate. We discuss
two aspects of this difference in particular:
a)  between dealers, depending on their marginal foreign currency valuations,
b)  between market segments with different trade mechanisms, i.e. direct and brokered.
From the FX risk management perspective, our model points at the latent variable that is primarily
responsible for exchange rate deviations from the “fundamental” levels. Namely, increased
volatility can originate in the marginal valuation heterogeneity across market participants. The
formal theoretical result could be employed in the design of procedures to extract the unobserved
distributions of the marginal currency values of the selling and the buying group of dealers from
time series of their quotes. This would provide a refinement of the standard VaR measure of FX
exposure.
A popular question among regulators concerns the preferred trade institution. A recognized cost of
using a direct inter-dealer market is price non-transparency and possible idiosyncratic price
distortions due to dispersed information across dealers. Therefore, some authors produced models
that claimed the inevitable advent of an electronic open limit order book as the sole trade platform
(Glosten, 1994), given its presumed transparency and lack of price discrimination. This was not
directly expressed with regard to the forex and, indeed, this market has proven to be incompatible
with the said prophecy. Direct dealership and various types of brokers have coexisted in this
market for years, and the Czech koruna is no exception to this rule (cf. Section 3). In our paper,
we show that the cost of price transparency in the brokered market can be higher than the benefit.
Specifically, since the brokered market’s transparency only refers to the pricing schedule and not
the counter-party identity (at least, not until after the transaction has been completed), the strategic
interaction between the order sender and order recipient is hampered. With our analysis of the
direct inter-dealer market, we demonstrate that this interaction not only leads to price discovery,
but also has gains-from-trade effects superior to the brokered market. This means that policy
measures should not be wasted in an attempt to support one or several brokers with the objective
of “draining” direct dealership of its users.
On the other hand, the co-existence of the direct and brokered markets should be used by the
monetary authority to:
a)  monitor the more transparent of the two FX trading institutions (i.e. brokers) to extract
information about the market as a whole,
b)  overcome undesired asymmetry in the dispersed information in the forex by designing
interventions in the direct inter-dealer segment.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   7
Structure of the paper: Section 2 sums up the prominent features of the current FX microstructure
research relevant to the work at hand. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the Czech koruna
market institutions and participants. Section 4 defines the model, the agents’ optimization
problems and optimal active trade rules at given quotes (pricing schedules). This is done in both
the direct inter-dealer and brokered inter-dealer market settings. In Section 5, we derive the
optimal quoting conditions in the direct and brokered markets and discuss consequences
concerning the role of marginal currency values for the price impact of the order flow. Section 6
outlines an imbedding of the one-shot inter-dealer game into a differential game between the same
players. This embedding facilitates the Nash equilibrium calculation, described in the technical
Appendix together with several proposition proofs. The second subsection of Section 6 discusses
the outcomes of numerical NE calculations for the one-period game and the corresponding
“reduced form” relations between order flows, prices and marginal FX values. Section 7
concludes.
2. State of the Art in the Forex Microstructure Research
Most existing FX microstructure models are anchored in abstract information microeconomics.
So, these models remain too far from both mainstream macro and practitioners’ thinking. To
bridge the gap successfully, one needs a model combining the optimizing paradigm of standard
macroeconomics with the key institutional features of the exchange rate setting taking place in the
inter-dealer market with explicit rules of interaction. (As one of the founders of the FX
microstructure economics, R. Lyons, 2001, puts it, “It is a stubborn fact that there is no other
exchange rate than that set by these people [i.e. dealers]…”)
Another existing conceptual gap is in the discrepancy between the formal FX microstructure
models of an agent who sets the fundamental asset (foreign currency) price and an agent who
discovers that price by participating in a specific trading institution.
Application of the theory is impaired by two artificial dividing lines:
a)  between the customer/investor and dealer/market maker roles of a financial institution,
b)  between the inventory handling and informational asymmetry/adverse selection factors
behind price setting by an individual market maker.
The most popular models prefer to view the inter-dealer market as a location for the redistribution
of customer order flow risks. To our knowledge, these models have not yet satisfactorily
explained the co-existence of multiple brokerage systems in the forex, nor have they established
the relative importance of dealers and other traders in generating persistent exchange rate
movements. Technical difficulties lead to simplifying assumptions about dealer rationality and the
precision of their knowledge of customer behavior. The outcomes of the models based on these
assumptions convey marginally richer descriptions of inter-dealer trade than the classical auction
market models, where agents condition on the market-clearing price (of which Kyle, 1985, is a
common prototype). The complexities of decentralized quoting and trading have forced some
authors to abandon the full rationality assumption. Instead, they model dealer interaction on a
bounded rationality basis and simulate the outcomes of their adaptive learning. Finally, not8   Alexis Derviz
enough work has been done so far on the distinctions between the brokered and direct segments of
the forex (each covers about half of the inter-dealer market transactions). Ideally one should be
able to model a mix of multiple direct dealerships and a brokered market with several institutional
– as well as “cyberspace” – venues.
The pivotal notion of the modern FX microstructure theory is the twofold concept of the
customer–dealer and dealer–dealer order flows. Both, although each in its own way, are
responsible for dissemination of price impulses across the market. Put concisely, it has been
convincingly demonstrated that order flow determines the exchange rate. But what determines the
order flow? Accordingly, the principal problem in the practical application of FX microstructure
theory is to identify the theoretical order flow variables known from the models with the publicly
available information on the actions of a given financial intermediary.
Most contributions to the current FX microstructure literature identify the client order flow as the
prime source of the new exchange rate information that is impounded in the prices set by the
dealers (Evans and Lyons, 2002). At the same time, it is recognized that the basic Evans–Lyons
paradigm of exchange rate formation implies a zero net client order flow, if aggregated across all
market makers. This happens because the optimizing dealer price-setting behavior dictates the
shift in the trade price to the level allowing the dealers to unwind undesired positions. Therefore,
their equilibrium quotes induce the clients to generate “second stage” orders that would offset that
part of their “first stage” orders made at the original quotes which is in excess of the dealer-
acceptable value. So, if the net client order flow may erroneously evoke an impression of no-
relation to the price change, what is the right order flow to look at?
One choice is the inter-dealer order flow, since it is generated by the dealers, who redistribute the
initially taken position risk coming from client trades. However, the inter-dealer order flow would
only reflect fundamental price information if the latter were dispersed asymmetrically among the
clients of individual dealers. On the contrary, there would not be any information revelation if all
dealers received the same client order flow signal. Therefore, one of the directions in which the
basic Evans–Lyons paradigm can be extended is the introduction of investors who choose
between, and trade with, several dealers almost simultaneously. Quite often, such traders are the
most important carriers of fundamental price signals.
On the empirical side, the inter-dealer order flow is usually difficult to separate from the one
coming from clients.
2 Orders of both categories arrive in random sequence and, moreover, a
dealer may be a carrier of even stronger exchange rate information than any of the non-dealer
investors, so his active trades are difficult to classify in accordance with the scheme outlined
above. In other words, the inter-dealer order flow includes, but is not limited to, “hot potato”
trades of unwanted currency quantities. Therefore, the primary and secondary reasons for the
inter-dealer order flow are impossible to distinguish in the data.
                                                
2 It is totally impossible in the brokered trade data. A number of researchers had access to the complete trade
books of a given dealer, which included information on the counter-party. Even then, the decision to classify the
same party as a dealer or a customer sometimes had to be taken on an ad hoc basis. It would be particularly
difficult in the case of the Czech koruna (or any other minor currency), where certain banks perform a market
maker function for a while and then stop doing so for a prolonged period. The present model does not have to
solve the problem, since it classifies any such bank as a “global market user” when modeling its active trades.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   9
Regardless of the crucial role of order flow in the price formation process, established
theoretically, the latter is publicly unobservable and has to be proxied. Equally unobservable are
the actual transaction prices. Therefore, most of the ground-breaking empirical research in FX
microstructure derives from studies of transaction data obtained privately on an ad hoc basis (see,
for example, the monograph by Frankel, Galli and Giovannini, 1996, for a collection of now
classic FX microstructure papers). That is, they cannot be reproduced on a regular basis for
policymaking purposes.
Several major international FX-dealer banks collect their own data on received client and inter-
dealer order flows. The best known example is Citibank with its Global Flow database. Such
activity can have a contributive value to the bank’s FX-position management, provided the order
flow data it collects are sufficiently representative, i.e. it begins to make sense only starting from a
certain market share level. Just a few institutions in the world qualify, and there is not a single
central bank among them. A central bank of a small open economy must look for alternative
sources of interpretable data. The present paper can serve as a guide as to what kind of
information can be useful or appropriate.
3. Participants and Institutions in the CZK Market
Spot transactions in the Czech koruna exist predominantly in the koruna–euro pair (important
investors wishing to exchange for CZK a position in another currency – USD, JPY, GBP, etc. –
usually create a EUR-position first). Derivative instruments in both the CZK/EUR and CZK/USD
pairs are more or less evenly distributed in terms of volume; historically, however, sufficient
liquidity in forwards and swaps could only be found in the CZK/USD pair. Currently, spot,
outright forward and FX swap quotes and trades on these two and a number of other currency
pairs are available from major dealers. On the other hand, the inter-bank market only operates
with spot and swap transactions (outright forwards for clients are constructed synthetically by
entering an FX swap and offsetting its spot leg with the inverted spot trade).
There is a domestic inter-bank FX market for koruna, where the formal number of participants is
eighteen, although at most eight execute more than 5 per cent of the trade volume in a given
segment (identified by currency pair and instrument, i.e. spot, swap or option). Many of the trades
they effectuate are initiated by parent companies outside the country. Each of the inter-bank
participants utilizes the direct dealership form of inter-bank trade interchangeably with voice- and
electronic FX-broker services (of the latter, Reuters Dealing-3000 is the only one actually used;
there is no evidence of EBS being in any way involved in CZK trading).
There is a considerable amount of offshore koruna trading. Some of it is difficult to separate from
the onshore operations described above, since the parent company of a domestically licensed bank
may decide to execute the same type of CZK sell or buy order either through this bank
domestically or itself, abroad. Specifically, direct inter-dealer and client–dealer koruna trades
without the participation of a domestically licensed entity are undertaken by a small number of
major internationally active dealer banks, such as Citibank, ABN–Amro, ING–Barings and
Deutsche Bank, who all have branches licensed in the Czech Republic. Still, there also seems to
be a permanent offshore koruna market segment in the proper sense, which exists, in part, due to a10   Alexis Derviz
number of minor internet brokers (e.g. Bear Sterns, Rada Forex, Tullett&Tokyo, Olsen and ass.,
etc.).
Our information about the operation of direct dealerships is limited to posted indicative dealer
quotes (on Reuters or Bloomberg screens). However, it has been documented in the empirical FX
microstructure literature that the deviations of the indicative from the effective quotes are rarely
significant and, under all circumstances, are very short-lived (about 10 minutes). Therefore,
indicative dealer quotes offer a relatively accurate measure of individual dealer pricing behavior.
On-line information on brokered forex is restricted to its users, so the exact picture of standing
quotes, the depth of the limit order book, and the direction and intensity of market orders is rarely
at the disposal of either regulators or analysts. (Our research is a step towards overcoming this
difficulty by analyzing the direct and brokered segments with the help of the same model.)
Given this variety of market structures and participants, modeling the operation of the Czech
koruna market may seem analytically insurmountable. Heavy stylizing offers the only chance of
discerning tangible objects of interest and clear-cut results. Therefore, the toolkit of
microstructure finance theory will be adopted in order to identify a modeling approach that will,
on the one hand, accommodate the key phenomena of interest and, on the other hand, be amenable
to formal treatment. In the model to be introduced next, we employ some of the most recent
achievements of market microstructure theory.
4. The Model
This section proposes a model of multiple dealer forex trading in two variants: for direct and
brokered market organization. In both variants, we shall consider a dealer, i.e. an agent who
makes the market by posting quotes, and an investor, who trades at dealers’ quotes without
placing her own. However, both types of agents will act as market users when they place their
own orders. The state variables and preferences of all agents will have the same structure. It is
assumed for definiteness that all agents are domestic residents, but this assumption is not pivotal
for the results.
The equilibrium order flow pattern is derived as a function of the shadow prices (marginal
valuations) of FX holdings across market participants. The shadow valuation heterogeneity (due
to differences in preferences, endowments or asset payoff information) gives rise to currency
purchases/sales initiated by those market users whose marginal currency value is high/low in
relation to the marginal valuation by the market maker. As a consequence, one would observe a
strong price impact of the order flow when it moves the marginal value of the recipient dealer
away from the no-trade level, and a weak or zero order flow impact when the received position
reverts the marginal value back to it. The Nash equilibrium of the studied one-period inter-dealer
game is obtained as a steady state Nash equilibrium of a differential game between the same
players. We also find that differences in equilibrium quoting behavior result in higher volumes of
inter-dealer trade in the brokered market compared to the direct market. Under both trading
mechanisms, however, hot potato trades are non-zero even if the dealers are perfectly symmetric,
since inter-dealer transactions are a necessary condition for price discovery. The brokered market
gains from trade are lower for a given level of investor demand for foreign currency.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   11
Let x
m be the domestic cash holdings and x
i the foreign cash holdings of a given investor. There is
an exogenous endowment y
m of domestic cash and y
i of foreign cash. The liquid wealth of the
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with positive constants m, i, m, i and . This definition of preferences implies that the agent’s
domestic and foreign assets (including, but not limited to, cash) are imperfect substitutes. The
agent may have short selling constraints, limits on open positions or other reasons to avoid
imbalances in the currency composition of his/her portfolio. Thus, negative cash holdings in either
currency (debt, short position) are penalized whereas positive holdings have decreasing marginal
value.
Each dealer quotes a pricing schedule that is a smooth convex transform of a linear schedule of
the form
p=+q,
where p is the transformed price, q is the quantity bid/offered (q<0 corresponds to purchases from
the client and q>0 to sales to the client) and ,  are constants, >0. The price is obtained by the
rule P=f(p), where f is a strictly positive, increasing and convex function on the real line. Our
standard example will be f(p)=e
cp, for some positive constant c. The fact that we do not use linear
pricing schedules directly, as, for example, in Kyle, 1985, and many papers following Kyle’s, is
explained by our effort to obtain internal solutions for individual investor problems and later – a
well defined Nash equilibrium - without the need to check whether the resulting prices are
positive. This is particularly important in the settings where a closed form solution cannot be
derived and numerical methods are used to calculate equilibrium transaction patterns.
In order to economize on notation and highlight the most important qualitative results, we shall
concentrate on the case where there are two dealers in the FX market (indexed by 1 and 2). There
is also a single representative global non-dealer investor, indexed by U. The word “global” means
that this market user approaches both dealers for quotes and trades.
4.1 Decentralized Dealership
In the market considered in this subsection, only bilateral quoting and trade between dealers and
other investors exists. That is, the market is fully non-transparent: although every agent obtains
both dealers’ quotes, the volumes of effectuated trades other than one’s own are unobservable.
Therefore, the effective transaction prices are unobservable as well. We do not assign
informational significance to any price signal, since the model does not consider stationary
distributions of uncertainty factors. (Were such distributions a part of the considered equilibrium,
they would be inferred by the dealers jointly from the orders and prices in the course of Bayesian12   Alexis Derviz
learning. However, in most real-life FX markets, it is doubtful whether the assumption of
stationary risk factors driving market user demands is justified.)
4.1.1 Global Non-Dealer Market User
We denote by 
i, 
i the parameters of the pricing schedule quoted by dealer j, j=1,2. The orders
placed by the investor at these quotes with the two dealers are denoted by Q
j, j=1,2 (Q
j>0 if the
order is for a foreign cash purchase). Then the end-of-period domestic and foreign cash holdings
of the investor are:
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( Q Q f Q Q f y x
m m          , (2a)
2 1 Q Q y x
i i    . (2b)
The investor maximizes (1) subject to (2). The parameters (
j,
j),j=1,2, of the market-maker
quoting schedules are taken as given by the market user.
Let m, i be the investor’s marginal utilities of the domestic and foreign cash, i.e.

















We shall also call these partial derivatives the investor’s shadow prices of the domestic and
foreign currency respectively.
For us, the most important part of optimal policies is the one which describes the currency
purchases/sales Q
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the relative marginal valuation of foreign currency by the market user. Then the optimal trades








 , j=1,2, (3)
where g is the implicit function solving the equation
                  ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
j j j j j g f g g f (4)FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   13
identically for all 
j and . Such a solution exists if  g f f      2 0  in the range of considered
parameters 
j and . Then g, which is the optimal traded quantity per unit of pricing schedule
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Expressions (5) show that the optimal currency demand/supply “per unit of spread”, denoted by g,
is decreasing in the mid-quote and increasing in the marginal foreign currency valuation. These
are intuitively correct properties of optimal orders: the market user buys more (sells less) of the
foreign currency when the pricing schedule intercept  that she faces goes down and when her
marginal valuation of the foreign currency goes up. The marginal valuation parameter  itself has
an interpretation of the market user demand intercept.
For our specific example of quoting rule f(p)=e
cp, the condition for the existence of internal
solution for optimal orders is given by g>-2/c, equivalently, Q>-2/(c), and the partial derivative



















4.1.2 Dealer’s Active Trades
Formally, the decision problem faced by the dealer is an extension of the one solved by the non-
dealer investor. For definiteness, the exposition in this subsection concerns dealer 1, with the
formulations for dealer 2 being obtained by substitution of indices.
At the start of the trading period, dealer 1 quotes a pricing schedule (
1,
1), which is good for
both the other dealer and the non-dealer global market user. Symmetrically, dealer 2 does the
same, so that his pricing schedule (
2,
2) is good for dealer 1 to trade at. The commonality of the
dealer’s quotes given to all market users, even in the decentralized market, allows us to simplify
the price impulse propagation modeling. We justify this assumption by referring to the
reputational considerations on the part of the dealer.
As is common in strategic trade models, some sort of noise- (i.e. not fully rational) traders are
needed to generate non-trivial transactions in the market. Here, noise traders will be introduced to
ensure non-zero exogenous quoting costs of the dealers. Specifically, dealers will always face a
situation in which the optimal choice of the pricing schedule slope  will be strictly positive and
finite. Any attempt to increase utility by reducing  to zero or infinitely increasing it will result in
an increasingly costly position received from a noise trader.
Formally, we shall assume that, after the active trades of dealers 1 and 2 and market user U have
been decided upon, the pricing schedule of each market maker can be randomly matched directly14   Alexis Derviz
with a similar schedule of an outside trader (i.e. someone whom we do not model explicitly). In
this way, a specific additional trade is generated at the dealer’s quote. This external matching
could be a consequence of the dealer’s bargaining with an important local customer (i.e. someone
trading only with this dealer, as opposed to the global investor, whom we model explicitly),
automatic crossing by a voice broker or another unspecified reason. (In the part describing the
brokered FX market, a similar automatic schedule crossing between contributors to the order book
will be an essential part of the brokerage process leading to a common pricing schedule, or state
of the book.) It is convenient to assume that the outside trader’s pricing schedule slope is equal to
that of the dealer. Technically, this element of the model allows one to obtain an internal solution
for the price schedule slope without affecting the main qualitative properties of equilibrium.
Matching happens by adding up the pricing schedules horizontally and effectuating the transaction
at the price that equalizes the dealer’s demanded quantity with the noise trader’s supplied










  be the
schedule of the noise trader (we will work in the space of transformed prices p). Then their joint















  . By substituting the transformed
price 
cj into the two dealers’ pricing schedules, we see that at this price, dealer j is willing to







  (sell if 
j>
j, buy in the opposite case), whereas the noise trader







Matching of the price schedules happens at a cost, which we define in domestic cash units. These
costs can be associated with the required provisions that the dealer must make for the eventuality
of noise trader matching. Specifically, let h be a strictly increasing and strictly concave function
on the real line with h(0)=0, h’(0)=1. When, as a result of price schedule matching with a noise
trader, the dealer sells (buys) q
c units of foreign currency, he receives (pays the negative of)
f(q
c)h(q
c) units of domestic cash, which is less (more in absolute value) than f(q
c)q
c. Our principal
example of the transaction function will be the linear-quadratic function h(q)=q-aq
2/2, a>0 a
constant. The origin of the non-linear cost of matching is in the precautions the dealer must take in
order to cope with situations where the transacted volume resulting from this trade gets out of his
control. That is the reason for the convex growth of costs with volume. Because of the non-
linearly growing matching costs, the dealer prefers to set a strictly positive pricing schedule slope
. Otherwise, he might be exposed to suboptimally high transaction volumes with the noise
traders.
Further, define by q
12 and q
21 the volumes of regular active trades directed by dealer 1 towards
dealer 2 and vice versa. We shall assume that dealer 1 has a certain degree of market power over
both market users who trade with him at his quotes. Namely, in his optimization problem, dealer 1
takes into account the demand/supply schedule (3) of the market user U and the similar schedule
of dealer 2 (we shall see shortly that each dealer’s active trades indeed satisfy an analogue of (3)).
We shall denote by 
2 the marginal currency valuation of dealer 2 and use superscript U for the
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The objective function of dealer 1 is defined by (1) as for any other market participant. It is now










The discussion of optimal quoting by the dealers is postponed until Section 5.
4.2 Brokered Market
The brokered inter-dealer FX market (real-life prototypes being either the EBS or Reuters Dealing
3000 electronic brokerage systems) will be modeled as an institution to which both dealers submit





 ,  j=1,2, as defined earlier. These schedules are added up
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b . At this automatic pricing schedule crossing occasion, dealer 1 sells to (if 
2>
1,








b q  at price f(
b).
3
In the same way as in the direct inter-dealer market case, we need to define the external costs of
quoting, caused by the existence of noise traders. We assume that each dealer can be randomly
matched by the same noise trader as defined in 4.1.2 for the direct market, instead of being
matched with the other dealer(s) by the broker. The prudential risk management rules of the dealer






i to cover for this contingency. These terms then appear in the dealer’s
state-transition equations. Their presence restricts the domain of the admissible pricing schedule
slopes 
1 and guarantees the existence of an internal solution to the dealer optimization problem.
Upon completion of the automatic crossing procedure, the broker announces the standing pricing
schedule to the two dealers and the non-dealer investor. This schedule is viewed as a horizontal
sum of the reduced schedules of the individual dealers. This means that the original dealer
schedule is reduced horizontally by the volume sold (or bought if 
2<
1) in the course of
                                                
3 The order in which the automatic pairwise crossing is conducted by the broker affects the involved transaction
prices, but not the automatically determined overall transaction volume of a given dealer with the rest. So, if one
intends to extend the current set-up to the case of three or more dealers, it is easiest to think of a broker who adds
up the individual pricing schedules horizontally in one batch, effectuating the transactions at a singe clearing




















































  for dealer 2, giving the standing schedule in sum.
Each of the three market users (two dealers and the non-dealer investor) then submit their orders













 among the two constituent schedules. Geometrically, this is equivalent to setting the
order proportion of a dealer by letting his reduced schedule intersect the horizontal line which
goes through the standing schedule point with 1
st coordinate Q (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1:  State of the Limit Order Book (the Standing Pricing Schedule Structure) and Market
Order Matching by the Broker
Note:   Q denotes the incoming market order (originating from either a dealer or non-dealer investor)
at the standing market schedule with parameters (
b, 
b). This schedule is obtained by crossing
the two dealer pricing schedules and adjusting to a common intercept 
b. The order is cleared
at price f(p)=f(
b+
bQ), whereas the order proportions are given by the relative slopes of the












, adding up to unity.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   17
Note that the formulation of the brokered market set-up requires a resolution of the following
dilemma. Should the market order submitted by the dealer be partially returned to himself in
accordance with the general rule defined above, or canceled out in some way by the dealer, who is
supposed to decide on market orders and quotes (limit orders) simultaneously? Fortunately, the
formal outcome of the dealer optimization problem resolution does not depend on which variant is
chosen. Here, we are taking the former view (a representative dealer partially “trading with
himself”), for reasons of expositional transparency.
4
The individual market participants’ optimization problems in the brokered market are defined
next.
4.2.1 Non-Dealer Global Market User
At the beginning of the trading period, the non-dealer investor who uses the brokered market faces
only the standing pricing schedule    Q f P
b b     , where Q is the market-user’s order size.
She maximizes (1) with respect to Q, given the current domestic and foreign cash holdings. Her
end-of-period cash holdings are
c Q Q f y x
b b m m     ) (   ,  (7a)
Q y x
i i   . (7b)
Therefore, the first-order condition of optimality is
   
U b b b b b Q f Q Q f            ,
similarly to what we have established in 2.1.1 for the direct market case, and the optimal order









Dealer 1, who uses the brokered market, decides upon the same variable as the non-dealer
investor (his order size, denoted by q
1), but also sets the parameters (
1,
1) of his pricing schedule
that would be incorporated into the standing pricing schedule by the broker. He knows and takes









which is placed with the broker by dealer 2 (we shall see in a moment that his own optimal order
is consistent with this assumption). From the broker, dealer 1 receives an order of size q
b1 at price
                                                
4 One can justify this by assuming that active trades and quotes are determined by separate units within the firm.18   Alexis Derviz
f(
b) resulting from automatic price schedule crossing and proportion  1 

b
 of orders Q and q
2 (see
above). Altogether, his end-of-period cash holdings are
 
1
1 1 ) , ( ) , (

    
b b b
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  in the above equations. As
mentioned earlier, this order returns to the dealer as the proportion  1 

b
 of the current market
order and at the same time is processed as his own market order. We shall see immediately that
this understanding is internally consistent.
The first-order condition of optimality for the dealer’s market order is
   
1 1 1 1            q f q q f
b b b b b .
















 , which is consistent with the assumption
(regarding dealer 2 order size) used in (9).
5. Dealer’s Optimal Quoting Policy
We return to the dealer 1 optimization problem from Section 4 to characterize the optimal quoting
strategies (i.e. the choice of parameters  and ). As before, we discuss the decisions of dealer 1
so that the other’s optimal moves are derived by symmetry.
Let us introduce the following notations:FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   19

  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 2
) , (
) , ( 1 ) , (
       
  
      g f g g f
g f
g
     
 
   ,
 ) , ( ) , (      g f P   , ) (
b b f P   , ) (
c c f P   .
) , (
2 1   P  ( ) , (
1 U P   , P
b, P
c1) is the effective transaction price at which the order of dealer 2
(non-dealer market user, dealer 2 in the course of the price schedule crossing by the broker, noise
trader by price schedule crossing) is executed by dealer 1 in the direct market (or brokered market
in the case of P
b). We consider prices  ) , (
2 1   P  and  ) , (
1 U P   , as well as auxiliary parameters
 as functions of the quoting parameter (transformed mid-quote price) 
1 and the marginal
valuation parameters 
2 and 
U respectively. A similar understanding should be applied in the
brokered market context.
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     
1 2 2 2 1 ) , ( ) , ( , ) , ( , ) , ( ) , (               
U U U s g g P g P g L     .
Similar variables (index 2 everywhere replacing 1, and vice versa) are defined for dealer 2.
Direct Inter-Dealer Market
Proposition 1 The first-order conditions for the objective function optimization w.r.t. quoting
parameters 
1 and 
1 of dealer 1 are given by equations
 ) , ( ) , (
2
1
) , , ; (
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1         D C L
U p   , (10a)
) , (
2
) , , ; (
1 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 1  
 
    C L
U s 
 . (10b)
The calculations leading to (10) are given in Section A1 of the Appendix.
An analogous pair of equations is valid for the optimization of 
2 and 
2 by dealer 2.
Brokered Inter-Dealer Market
We will need additional notation, which we introduce by putting
 ) (
) (
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Proposition 2 The first-order conditions for the current value Hamiltonian optimization w.r.t.
quoting parameters 
1 and 
1 of dealer 1 are given by equations
 ) , , ; ( ) , ( ) , (
2
) , , , (
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
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2 1 2 1 1 U b p L D C B        
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2 1 1 U b s L      . (11b)
See Section A1 of the Appendix for the proof.
We now define a normal form game between dealer 1 and dealer 2, with the action space of each
player consisting of his quoting parameters  and , >0, and his payoff given by (1) subject to
(6) (in the direct market) or (9) (in the brokered market). The optimal active trade rules of the
dealers, the same as the non-dealer investor, stated in (3) or (8), are taken as given. The investors’
endowments  y in both currencies are exogenous. For given marginal currency valuation
parameters 
 1, 
 2 and 
 U, the four equations (10) for the direct inter-dealer market and (11) for
the brokered market would give a pair of quoting rules. (The latter themselves determine the end-




 U.) By fixing the parameters of the non-dealer investor and the other
dealer, one can regard the optimal quoting rule (,) of each dealer that solves (10) (or (11)) as a
reaction function. Their intersection gives the Nash equilibrium of the one-period trading game
between dealers 1 and 2. Accordingly, the Nash equilibrium is the 10-dimensional vector (x,,)
of the investor cash holdings and the dealer quoting parameters that satisfy the ten equations (2),
(6), (10) for the direct market, and (7), (9), (11) for the brokered market.
Observe that (10b) and (11b) imply the following expression for the marginal currency valuation
of the dealer in the case where the noise trades are negligible:

































Qualitatively, (12) and its generalizations
5 mean that the dealer’s marginal currency value in any
one-shot equilibrium is equal to the sum of the effective transaction prices paid by the remaining
market participants weighted by their normalized orders. This opens the way to empirical
estimates of the dealer marginal values.
                                                
5 A straightforward analogue of this equation happens to be valid for generalizations of the model with more
than two dealers.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   21
6. Equilibrium of the Static Inter-Dealer Game and the Steady State
Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game
This section first explains the method of equilibrium derivation in the inter-dealer game and then
discusses the properties of equilibrium prices and trades obtained numerically. The possibility of
numerical solution is a direct consequence of the relation between the original static game and the
more general differential game.
6.1 Embedding of the One-Period Game
Calculation of the inter-dealer game Nash equilibrium as defined in the previous section requires
solving a system of non-linear equations for the choice variables of market participants. Such a
solution cannot be obtained in closed form, and even its numerical calculation by standard
methods proves to be computationally difficult. There exists a way around this difficulty, based on
constructing an alternative procedure for equilibrium derivation. It consists in defining a dynamic
(differential) game for the same set of players and, basically, the same rules as the one-shot inter-
dealer game discussed before. The exogenous parameters of this differential game can then be
chosen in such a way that any steady state equilibrium of the dynamic game is equivalent to the
Nash equilibrium of the original static one. However, the dynamic perspective will help us prove
a number of properties of the steady state equilibrium that will simplify its calculation. Thanks to
these simplifications, we are able to obtain the numerical solution to the Nash equilibrium
problem. The dynamic game is also of interest in its own right, since it broadens our
understanding of possible forex behavior patterns in continuous time. Unfortunately, the complete
characterization of Nash equilibria is complicated by the highly involved stability structure of the
corresponding dynamic system. Nevertheless, by finding out this complex structure in the
dynamic model, we should be less surprised by the excess volatility observed in the real-life
forex. We also see that there should be a link between the institutional arrangements prevailing in
the market and the volatility magnitude.
Below, we give a brief outline of the differential game in which the one-period game of Section 4
can be embedded as a steady state.
Now we will deal with the flow variables (trade orders q, Q) in the form of rates per infinitesimal
time period dt. Also, we define an exogenous endowment rate y
m (endowment per period dt) of
domestic cash and a similar endowment rate y
i of foreign cash. For simplicity, we only consider
constant cash endowment rates in this paper.
A consumption/dividend payment rate c is subtracted from the current domestic cash holdings.
The dividends are evaluated by the period utility function c u(c) with standard properties
(increasing, strictly concave). With a certain infinitesimal probability, the investor may need to
stop operations in the current period and submit his/her book to an audit, which evaluates the cash
holdings by means of a “liquidation” value function   ) , (
i m x x v(x
m,x
i), i.e. the same as the
wealth utility function of the static problem of Sections 4 and 5.
We shall assume that the arrival of the said liquidation event is a Poissonian random event with
intensity . With probability e
-dt, the operation will be continued in the immediate infinitesimal22   Alexis Derviz
time interval dt after the present moment, and with complementary probability 1- e
-dtdt the
investor will have to liquidate within dt. A similar random termination feature, although in
discrete time setting, is used in Foucault, 1999. It allows one to analyze the stationary equilibria of
a dynamic order placement and execution model with a potentially infinite number of trading
rounds.
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Maximization is achieved by choosing the trajectory of dividends, active trades (purchases or
sales of domestic against foreign currency through a market maker) and, if the agent is a dealer,
the trajectory of quotes.
Note that, thanks to the presence of liquidation function v  in the current utility in (13), the
problem does not require the imposition of transversality conditions: explosive x-paths are
excluded by the defined properties of function v.
The state transition equations will be different depending on the investor category (dealer or not)
and the market structure (decentralized or brokered). They are similar to the cash holding variable
definitions of Section 2, but describe cash change rates instead of levels. Specifically, the non-
dealer market user in the direct market has the state-transition equations
c Q Q f Q Q f y x
m m      
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2 1 Q Q y x
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The state-transition equations for the same dealer in the brokered market are (cf. (9))
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Note that (14a)–(16a) contain the dividend rate c, which was not defined in the one-period case.
Another substantial difference compared to (2), (6) and (9) lies in the definition of marginal






  ,  being the adjoint variables of the corresponding optimization problem (see
Section A2 of the Appendix for details). With this caveat in mind, the remaining state-transition
equations can be defined by building an analogy with (2), (7) and (9).
We proceed by using (13)–(16) and the analogous transition equations for the remaining market
participants to define a differential game between the non-dealer investor, dealer 1 and dealer 2
(actually, two games: one for the direct and the other for the brokered market). The payoff is
given by (13) for both market organizations, every participant and every time moment. We shall
consider the open-loop Nash equilibria of this game. This choice seems intuitively more
appropriate for modeling FX dealer interaction than closed-loop equilibria. The latter would imply
that each dealer is able to evaluate the impact of his quoting and trading behavior on the actions of
others. Such ability would not be plausible in a multi-dealer environment with a limited degree of
transparency. Moreover, we will concentrate specifically on steady state Nash equilibria in this
class.
Proposition 3 Let the differential inter-dealer game defined by payoffs (13) and state transition
equations (14)–(16) (and their appropriate analogues) possess an open-loop steady state
equilibrium for, at least, a collection of finite intervals of constant cash endowment rates y
km, y
ki,
k=1, 2, U. For each one-period inter-dealer game with initial cash endowments 
km y ~ , 
ki y ~ , k=1,
2, U, from a non-empty interval, there exists a set of parameters of the differential game such that
the steady state Nash equilibrium of the latter corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the former.
This proposition and other properties of the steady state are proven in Section A3 of the
Appendix. The immediate technical value of the result consists in the possibility of simplifying
the Nash equilibrium search in the one-period game of Section 5. A direct calculation of the latter
would involve a solution of a rather complex system of ten non-linear equations for ten unknowns
(six cash holding variables and four quoting parameters). In the dynamic game, a part of the
complexity is removed since one characterizes the Nash equilibria by means of three interrelated
maximum principles (one for each market participant). Transition to the steady state Nash
equilibrium means further simplification and dimensionality reduction.
There is one immediate application of Proposition 3. It exploits the said steady state Nash
equilibrium feature of the one-period game in characterizing what are known as “hot potato”
inter-dealer trades. In this setting, we define a hot potato trading pattern as an equilibrium
outcome in which the gross inter-dealer order flow (the sum of net dealer orders) is bigger in
absolute value than the net inter-dealer order flow. Formally, the gross inter-dealer flows in the




2 respectively, whereas the net inter-




2. The absence of hot potato trades would mean that at most one




2 is different from zero, i.e. a dealer would not place an order which is24   Alexis Derviz
due to be offset by an opposite order in equilibrium. In the present model, however, the Nash
equilibria generically involve hot potato trades. This fact can be established in any equilibrium
with given exogenous parameter values, when it is calculated numerically. The easiest, but also
most spectacular, outcome is obtained analytically, when one considers the equilibrium with
perfectly symmetric dealers. It turns out that hot potato trades are present even then.
Proposition 4 Assume that the external matching (cf. 4.1.2 and 4.2.2) happens according to the
same rule with the same parameters for both dealers, and that the quoting rule is exponential, as
defined in 4.1. If the structural parameters and cash endowments of both dealers are identical,
then the Nash equilibrium of the one-period game is characterized by non-zero inter-dealer order
flow q
12=q
21 in the direct market and q
1=q
2 in the brokered market every time the customer order
flow Q
1=Q
2 or Q is itself non-zero.
The proof, conducted directly for the steady state equilibrium of the dynamic game, is given in
Section A4 of the Appendix.
The result of Proposition 4 follows from the fact that, for a given dealer, the strategy of making
use of the market-making function of the other dealer always dominates the strategy of abstaining
from inter-dealer trade. Since the hot potato trades between symmetric dealers are Pareto-inferior
to the no inter-dealer trade outcome, in a repeated one-period game there would exist a possibility
of coordinating on a collusive no-trade outcome. However, this is hardly an intuitive outcome in a
market with many competing dealers. In such a market, either the counter-party transparency is
incomplete (brokered organization) or the chance of collusion is undermined by competition from
other dealers (direct organization). Although in this paper we model just two dealers, this is done
mainly for reasons of computational tractability (a discussion of Nash equilibrium properties
obtained numerically follows in the next subsection). The overall objective is to study FX markets
where one part of the participants may develop an intrinsic need to buy and the other to sell,
which is expressed by different marginal utilities of foreign cash in equilibrium. So, our dealer 1
and dealer 2 just perform the roles of representatives for bigger groups with homogenous marginal
currency values. In such an environment, coordination on a no-hot-potato trade equilibrium in a
repeated game is as good as irrelevant.
The possible equilibrium trajectories of the differential game defined above are not limited to
saddle paths converging to a steady state. One can identify three Lyapunov functions
(corresponding to Hamiltonians of the three market participants) that must be constant along any
open-loop equilibrium trajectory. There are probably multidimensional attractors for the
trajectories lying on the level surfaces of these three functions. The exact picture is so far unclear.
In any case, almost all equilibrium trajectories of the dynamic game are periodic or quasi-periodic
and do not have a single point of convergence. Therefore, the dynamic inter-dealer interaction in
our model exhibits enough complexity to match the observed volatility of the real forex.
To draw more specific qualitative conclusions, we now return to the one-period set-up of Sections
4 and 5 and comment upon the findings obtained by solving for its Nash equilibrium numerically.
Given the result of Proposition 3, the qualitative discussion to follow in the next subsection will
mainly concentrate on the outcomes of steady state calculations for the dynamic game, instead of
the Nash equilibrium in the original one-period game. We will discuss numerical results for
dealer-symmetric NE in particular, since they can be relatively easily illustrated graphically.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   25
6.2  Equilibria of the One-Period Game: the Role of Customer Order Flow Under
Different Market Organizations
As was already mentioned, closed-form solutions for Nash equilibria in the one-period inter-
dealer game do not exist. Numerically, one can derive equilibrium trading patterns by solving for
the steady state Nash equilibrium in the “enclosing” differential inter-dealer game. We have done
this for the interval of non-dealer foreign currency endowments that corresponds to her order flow
(OF) values in the interval [-1,1].
Let us recall the pivotal role of the indirect marginal utility of foreign cash for the quoting and
order placement behavior. To illustrate that role, we show in Figs. 2–5 how the NE trading pattern
depends on this marginal value of the non-dealer investor and, equivalently, on her order flow (in
the dealer-symmetric equilibrium we are discussing now, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the two). These figures contain marginal FX values, order flows and transaction
prices/exchange rates (ER) obtained by calculating Nash equilibria numerically for different
exogenous characteristics of the non-dealer investors. The NE calculation results demonstrate the
following similarities and differences of the two market structures, “in reduced form”:
a)  The effective transaction prices, the mid-quote and the marginal FX values of dealers and
clients are all increasing functions of the client order flow, regardless of the trading
mechanism. Accordingly, both the direct and brokered market show an intuitively correct
dependence on the market user “demand intercept”, represented by the marginal foreign
cash value.
b)  Since the dealer parameters in the equilibrium we are discussing are identical, the inter-
dealer trading is reduced to hot potato transactions. In the discussed equilibrium, they are
represented by purchase orders that have the objective of compensating for the foreign
currency holding reduction caused by customer purchases. This is true for both trading
mechanisms.
c)  Surprisingly, the hot potato orders in this equilibrium are still buying ones even when the
client OF becomes negative (i.e. the non-dealer investors sell). This is so because client
sales depress the price to levels that encourage dealers to buy.
d)  Under any client order flow, the inter-dealer OF in the brokered market is higher than in
the direct market. That is, the same volume of client orders induces higher inter-dealer
activity in the brokered market. This means that this market is more “effort-consuming”.
e)  Quoted dealer spreads (parameters  of the model) are lower in the direct market when
clients sell and in the brokered market when clients buy, per unit of client order flow.
f)  Effective spreads: Clients in the direct market pay a higher price margin over the mid-
quote than dealers when they place a big buying order, i.e. effective client ask half-spreads
in the direct market are higher than effective inter-dealer ask half-spreads, except for small
orders. In the brokered market, the buy order volume for which the effective client ask
half-spreads become higher than the inter-dealer half-spreads is more elevated. (Effective
bid half-spreads are hard to compare since, in this equilibrium, dealers only place buy
orders.)
g)  Altogether, the same level of client demand or supply corresponds to a smaller adjustment
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weaker ability of investor welfare improvement by means of market order placement
compared to the direct market.
We see that the two markets, at least in the equilibrium considered above, behave similarly in the
qualitative sense but are characterized by different effective prices, spreads and inter-dealer trade
volumes.
Figure 2:  Trade patterns as a function of the investor indirect marginal utility of foreign
currency holdings
(a) Direct inter-dealer market
(b) Brokered inter-dealer market
Note: The figure shows the trade pattern outcomes of the one-period quoting and trading game,
corresponding to different values of the marginal foreign cash valuation of the representative
non-dealer investor. The marginal foreign currency value is the endogenous indirect utility of
the non-dealing investor obtained in the Nash equilibrium, and is in a one-to-one
correspondence with this investor’s per-dealer order flow, which is the negative of the
exogenous investor foreign cash endowment.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   27
Figure 3: Trade patterns as a function of the non-dealer investor order flow per dealer
(a) Direct inter-dealer market
(b) Brokered inter-dealer market
Note: The figure shows the trade pattern outcomes of the one-period quoting and trading game,
corresponding to different values of the representative non-dealer investor per-dealer order
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Figure 4: Exchange rate setting and effective transaction prices as functions of the non-dealer
investor order flow per dealer
(a) Direct inter-dealer market
(b) Brokered inter-dealer market
Note: The figure shows the effective customer–dealer and inter-dealer transaction prices and the
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Figure 5: Comparison of the direct and brokered trading mechanisms for a given level of the
client’s order flow per dealer
(a) Inter-dealer order flows and effective exchange rates paid by the client
(b) Inter-dealer order flows and effective exchange rates paid by the dealer
Note: The figure shows the dealer order flows and effective customer–dealer (first panel) and inter-
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7. Conclusion
We have investigated the question of the relationship between FX transaction prices and order
flows by means of a static and dynamic model of the inter-dealer quoting and trading game. The
pivotal feature of the model was the presence of a global market user who traded with two
competing dealers by splitting her orders optimally between them. We have studied both the
direct inter-dealer and the brokered inter-dealer FX market cases.
The main result of the analysis is the key role of a dealer’s current marginal valuation of foreign
cash (the ratio of the marginal indirect utilities of foreign and domestic cash holdings) for the
impact that the incoming order flow has on his price-setting behavior. When dealers are
symmetric, they still place orders with each other in equilibrium, generating what are known as
“hot potato” trades. Asymmetry of marginal valuations, caused by either different endowments,
information or customer base composition, is the reason why there exists inter-dealer trade other
than hot potato transactions. The marginal currency value is also the variable through which new
orders, coming from both other dealers and non-dealer customers, exercise an impact on the
quoted prices, by channeling information about fundamental changes in currency supply and
demand. Institutional differences between the direct and brokered market structures are reflected
in the quantitative relationships between the marginal values and the patterns of trade, but do not
affect the main qualitative link between the marginal values, prices and equilibrium customer
order flow.
Specifically, we have shown that:
a)  the price impact of the market user order flow is determined by the marginal indirect utility
of foreign cash on the order placer and order recipient side;
b)  hot potato inter-dealer trading is a part of the equilibrium trading pattern, i.e. it is present
even when the dealers are completely identical. The reason is that the presence of at least
one dealer makes it individually optimal for other dealers to unwind the FX position
imbalances through trade with him, rather than try to coordinate a no-trade outcome (a
phenomenon of the prisoner dilemma type). In the Nash equilibrium with hot potato trades,
the latter forces dealers to reveal their marginal currency valuations to other dealers;
c)  the institutional arrangement of the forex makes a quantitative difference: for a given level
of customer indirect utility value of foreign cash, the brokered market features higher inter-
dealer order flow and lower customer prices. The direct market exhibits a stronger price
response to customer orders than the brokered market. On the other hand, the qualitative
dependence of order flow and price (exchange rate) on the marginal indirect utility level
distribution is similar;
d)  the above feature contrasts with the “reduced form” view of the dependence between the
customer order-flow, inter-dealer trades and transaction prices, established for the steady
state Nash equilibrium (or the Nash equilibrium of the one-period game). We find that in
the brokered market, the inter-dealer order flow is roughly twice as big as in the direct
market for a given level of client demand or supply. With increasing client order flow,
client effective prices surpass the inter-dealer effective prices earlier than in the brokered
market. This comparative static assessment shows that the cost the investors have to bear
for maintaining liquidity (and the price they have to pay for transparency) in the brokeredFOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   31
market exists in the form of discouragement of big market orders. Moreover, by placing
the same market order, the non-dealer investor in the brokered market achieves a lower
adjustment of her marginal FX utility. Consequently, brokered markets limit the
participants’ ability to improve welfare by trade, compared to direct markets.
Under either market organization, the observed time series of the exchange rate is not enough to
construct a sufficient statistic of the potential market imbalance. The reason is that the space of
sufficient statistics has a higher dimension: it includes the unobserved marginal currency values
of representative groups of forex participants. The observed time series from which these latent
values can be extracted (e.g. by filtering techniques) can be either the high frequency quote series
of individual representative market makers (in the direct inter-dealer market) or the high
frequency limit- and market-order series of a representative broker (in the brokered market).
Unsolved Problems
Modeling direct and brokered FX market coexistence is technically and computationally difficult.
The hypothesis we think is important to explore is that the co-existence of the two market
structures is possible because the two mechanisms are utilized differently. The more routine,
“technical” or arbitrage trading is probably more appropriately addressed at the brokered segment,
whereas the “information-based”, or simply large or “fundamentally” important, transactions are
better served by the direct dealership segment.
Study of the models with full dealer rationality requires a degree of sophistication that is no longer
realistic with regard to the actual information processing and formal analytical capacities of the
market participants. It seems that models reverting to bounded rationality, e.g. adaptive and
evolutionary learning, have a chance to produce more plausible results than the standard
optimization paradigm of theoretical finance.
Looking at the model findings from the viewpoint of central bank interventions and
communication with the forex, we think a relevant question is: will the central bank better pursue
its goals by acting as a “local” player, with a fixed limited number of preferred counter-parties?
Or should it act “globally”, by reserving itself the option of addressing any market maker any time
when it sees the right occasion to release its message by means of an (intervention) trade?
Intuitively, it seems that the global role may sometimes be preferable, but a formal confirmation
of this conjecture requires modeling heterogeneous investors on the customer side. This is a topic
of future research.
Finally, since the model has disclosed the key role of the marginal utility (shadow) value of the
currency in market participants’ pricing and trade decisions, can the exchange rate policy hope to
influence this value when it pursues a specific objective such as ERMII?32   Alexis Derviz
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Appendix
A1 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Direct Inter-Dealer Market
The problem of dealer 1 can be formulated as optimization of the objective function H
q1 given by
1 1 1 1
2 1 1
1 ) ( ) (
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(in the notation of Section 5), with respect to , , with parameters  defined in Subsection 4.1.1.
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and, for any fixed value of , the above expression is equalized to zero for a single positive value
of  (this partial derivative is positive for  below this critical value and negative for  above it).
This proves (10a).
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proving (10b). This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Brokered Inter-Dealer Market
The problem of dealer 1 is equivalent to maximizing
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1. Denote the right-hand side of (A1) by H(
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Next, invoking (8) for 
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proving (11a). To prove (11b) observe that
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Applying the last equality in (A3), the three equalities (A4) and the market order optimality
condition    ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
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b b b b P g g f     , the last expression can be reduced to
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meaning that, by (A6),
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from which (11b) follows36   Alexis Derviz
A2 Trading Strategies and Equilibrium Outcomes in the Differential Inter-Dealer Game
We shall use the Hamiltonian characterization of the solution to the optimal control problem (13)
of a given investor, with state-transition equation (14), (15), (16) or analogous. For example, the
current value Hamiltonian for dealer 1 in the direct market is defined as
) , ( ) ( ) , , , , , , (
2 1 i m
i m
i m U x x v c u Q Q c x x H     
   




m                ,( A 7 )
where  m,  i are adjoint variables of the problem. Their evolution is described by the Euler
equations, to be featured shortly. We shall call these adjoint variables of the investor’s
optimization problem shadow prices of the domestic and foreign currency respectively. They
constitute the currency valuation by means of the investor’s indirect utility.
Under the made assumptions about the strict concavity of utility functions u and v and the growth
properties of function v at infinity, the optimal policies of the global market user can be
characterized by the first-order conditions following from the Maximum Principle (see e.g.
Fleming and Rishel, 1975):
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for every market participant, established by direct inspection of the maximum principle. The




Analogously, in the brokered market, the current value Hamiltonian optimization by dealer 1
implies the first-order conditions of optimality
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characterizing the dividend rate and own order size.
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V
k being the value function of investor’s problem (the result of maximization in (13)). These
results are the two first-order conditions on dealer 1’s quoting parameters 
1 and 
1, and, by
symmetry, two analogous conditions must be valid for dealer 2’s quoting parameters
2 and 
2.FOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   37
The quoting parameters themselves depend on current and future values of 
 , i.e. to obtain the full
characterization of equilibrium quotes, one needs to solve for the Nash equilibrium in the
differential game. An embedded one-shot game at every time moment can be isolated if one fixes




 U ), since individual optimal orders and quoting
parameters at each moment are well-defined functions of 
 . We are mostly interested in the
embedded game corresponding to the steady state.

































(as usual, subscripts denote partial derivatives). If we denote by j the inverse function to the
marginal utility u of the investor’s dividend rate, then optimization of the latter in the steady
state implies c=j(vm(x
m,x
i)). These facts will be used in the next two sections.
A3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let n=[,]
T be the 4-dimensional vector of the optimal quoting rules, considered a function of
the 3-dimensional vector  of the three marginal foreign currency valuations of the market
participants: n=N(). Further, let k(n) denote the terms in the cash position 6-equation system (2),
(6) (in the direct market) or (7), (9) (in the brokered market), with the expressions (3) or (7) for
the optimal active trades already substituted. That is, we write symbolically
) ( ~ ~ n k y x
m m m 	 
 , (A11a)
) ( ~ ~ n k y x
i i i   , (A11b)
where  x ~  is the 6-dimensional vector of the cash positions of the two dealers and the non-dealer
market user, whereas  y ~ is the 6-dimensional vector of their start-of-the-period cash endowments.
For a given  y ~, we are looking for such a end-of-period cash holding vector x ~  that the Nash
equilibrium defined at the end of Section 3 is attained. This means that the condition
) ~ ( ) ~ ( ) ( ~ x M x N N n       , (A12)
must be satisfied for   
U     , ,








i l   , l=1,2,U. Solution x ~  to the system (A11),
(A12) is the Nash equilibrium of the one-period inter-dealer game. To prove Proposition 4, we
shall find an endowment rate vector y in the dynamic game such that its steady state Nash
equilibrium quoting rule  ) ( N n   is equal to n ~ . This is equivalent to requiring that the steady
state NE cash holding vector x  satisfies the equality  ) ~ ( ) ( x M x M  , equivalent to  ) ~ ( ) ( x x    .
First observe that (A11) can be written as  y x n k ~ ~ ) ~ (   , whereas the steady state NE in the
differential game (first-order conditions plus constancy of x and ) can be summarized as
m
m
m y x v j n k   ) ( ) (  , (A13a)38   Alexis Derviz
i i y n k  
 ) ( , (A13b)
Note that (A13) is a non-trivial consequence of the maximum principle and the steady state
conditions for variables x and . It is at this point that the results of dynamic game theory help us
to comply with the NE equilibrium conditions in the one-period game.
In order to obtain the one-period game NE from the steady state NE, we must make sure that the
right-hand side of (A13) be equal to  y x n k ~ ~ ) ~ (   . This implies that the sought endowment rates
y
m, y
i generate x ~  according to the rule
m m m
m
m y y x v j x    ~ ) ( ~  , 
i i i y y x   ~ ~ , (A14)
and, to prove our statement, we must find y that generate steady state NE cash holdings x  that
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Now, observe that one can generate any vector  ) (x     with strictly positive components by
varying  x . So, if we find  ) (x     to satisfy (A5), endowment rates y can be reconstructed from




i      has a full rank
Jacobian at least on the open, everywhere dense subset of R
3+, we conclude that its range must be
equal to the whole real line. Actually, there is a lot of freedom in the choice of x , which means
that one can generate different “convergence speeds” to the one-period game NE. This concludes
the proof
A4 Proof of Proposition 4
We will proceed by deriving the steady state equilibrium equation system separately for the direct
and brokered market mechanisms. Then we go over to the symmetric steady state case and prove
the statement of Proposition 4 for the direct market. The proof for the brokered market is fully
analogous.
Recall that the differential equations describing the optimal behavior of dealer 1, dealer 2 and the
non-dealer market user are given by state-transition equations (14)–(16) (or their analogues) and
(A9) (adjoint equations describing the evolution of the co-state variables for all three players).
The quoting rule f is exponential: 
cp e p f 
 ) ( , c>0. Then the auxiliary function  introduced at
the beginning of Section 3 reduces to
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We have assumed that the external matching happens according to the same rule with the same
parameters for both dealers, so that the -parameter is common for them. Let us rewrite the otherFOREX Microstructure, Invisible Price Determinants   39
two auxiliary functions, C and D, in terms of variables q
c and  instead of the original  and .
They become
























q c D .
Similar notations (index 2 replacing 1) will be used for dealer 2.
We shall now go over to choosing a more convenient set of variables for which the steady state
will be characterized.
First, looking at the structure of the steady state conditions for our set of differential equations, we
note that (4a), (15a), (16a) relate the steady state values of the domestic cash shadow price, m,
with the remaining variables, whereas this variable does not appear alone in any other equation.
Therefore, one can replace the pair (m,i) by the pair (m,) in further considerations, thus
eliminating the necessity to involve the steady state versions of (14a)–(16a) in the calculations to
follow.
Second, observe that for any agent, neither the right-hand side of the state-transition equation for
x
i, i.e. (14b), (15b), or (16b), nor the first-order conditions of optimality, i.e. (3), (8), (10), or (11),
depends on the state variables x. Therefore, these equations can be used to pin down the three
marginal values and the two pairs of optimal quoting parameters, (
k,
k), k=1,2. Subsequently,
the steady state conditions for the adjoint equations (A9) can be used to determine the steady state
values of the state variables x. Accordingly, one does not need to include (A9) in the intermediate







 U and only deals with (14b)–(16b),
(10) and (11).
Third, observe that, most of the time, the marginal currency values  appear only as arguments in
functions g. The only exceptions are functions L
p and L
s in (10), (11). In these expressions, it is
more convenient to revert back from  to terms containing g only, by using the left-hand side of
the second equation in (A8). Instead of g, we shall use the trade volume variables q and Q
directly, since it turns out to be simpler in terms of notation.
A4.1 Direct Inter-Dealer Market
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(and similarly for dealer 2).40   Alexis Derviz
The next step is substitution of the above expressions into the first-order conditions (10),
collecting terms that contain 
 1, on the left-hand side and dividing by exp(c
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In addition, the optimal trade volumes of the non-dealer market user are linked, in accordance
with (7), by the equality
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Note that (A16)–(A18) are valid outside the steady state as well; all we have done is change
notations. To analyze the steady state, one must add to (A16), (A17) and the corresponding pair of
first-order conditions for dealer 2 the three equations that state the constancy of the foreign cash
holdings in the steady state. By denoting the foreign cash endowments of dealer 1, dealer 2 and
the market user by y
1i, y
2i and Y

















A4.2 Brokered Inter-Dealer Market
This time, (7) implies that
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In the same way as in A4.2, we will use q
c1, q
c2 instead of 
1, 
2 as unknown variables. It can be
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1 appearing in the first-order
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Therefore, after minor transformations, the first-order conditions (11) can be written, analogously
with (A16), (A17), as
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Similar equations must hold for dealer 2.
These equations must be completed with the three steady state conditions following from (16b)




































































2. In the brokered market, the system (A22)–(A25) has six






2. These systems must be solved to obtain the
steady state Nash equilibria. In full generality this can only be done numerically.
A4.3 Dealer-Symmetric Steady State, Direct Market
The complete symmetry of both the parameters and behavior of dealer 1 and dealer 2 implies that
the market user’s trades with the two market makers are also identical. Accordingly, we have only
four unknown variables instead of the original eight: q – the inter-dealer trade volume, Q – the42   Alexis Derviz
customer trade volume, q
c – the volume of trade in external matching (looking for q
c is equivalent
to looking for , the dealer mid-quote), and  – the slope of the dealer pricing schedule. Since
(A18) is now vacuous and (A19), (A20) become one, we are also left with only four equations:
(A16), (A17) (both simplified), (A19) and (A21). Denoting by y
i the now common per-period
dealer endowment with foreign cash, we observe that Q and q
c are fully determined by the steady




y q   , 
2
i Y
Q   . The corresponding simplified versions
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    . (A28)
This is a system of two equations for two unknowns, q and . Except for an exceptional
combination of exogenous parameters, including the condition Y
i=0 that was excluded from
consideration in Proposition 4, q=0 cannot be a part of the solution for the system (A27), (A28).
That is, generically, “hot potato” trade cannot be avoidedCNB Working Papers Series
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